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"Newtonian Government:" Is the Contract with
America Unconstitutional?
INTRODUCTION
Section 106 of the Contract with America (the "House Rule")
provides:
SEC. 106. The Rules of the House of Representatives of the One Hundred
Third Congress, including applicable provisions of law or concurrent
resolution that constituted rules of the House at the end of the One Hun-
dred Third Congress, together with such amendments thereto in this
resolution as may otherwise have been adopted, are adopted as the Rules
of the House of Representatives of the One Hundred Fourth Congress,
with the following amendments:
Limitation on Tax Increases
(a) THREE-FIFTHS VOTE REQUIRED FOR TAX INCREASE
MEASURES AND AMENDMENTS.-In clause 5 of rule XXI, add
the following new paragraph at the end:
"(c) No bill or joint resolution, amendment, or conference report
carrying a Federal income tax rate increase shall be considered as
passed or agreed to unless so determined by a vote of not less than
three-fifths of the Members voting."'
The debate over whether this rule should be enacted was hotly
contested. Representative Watt called the supermajority measure
"unAmerican and unconstitutional.' 2 Representative Borski as-
serted that "[sluch a rule, however, runs contrary to the funda-
mental democratic principle of majority rule. The Constitution
clearly specifies the exceptional cases in which a supermajority is
required.... [R]equiring a supermajority vote on taxes sets dan-
gerous precedent that could be used to create similar require-
ments for other controversial issues."3 Representative Porter
expressed his reservation regarding the constitutionality of the
House Rule but asserted "[tihis obviously, ultimately, would be a
1. H.R. Res. 6, 104th Cong., let Sess. § 106 (1995).
2. 141 CONG. REc. H42 (daily ed. January 4, 1995) (statement of Represen-
tative Watt).
3. 141 CONG. REc. H43 (daily ed. January 4, 1995) (statement of Represen-
tative Borski).
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question for the judicial branch to be resolved in the course of
litigation challenging the constitutionality of our rule."4
On the other side of the debate Representative Franks con-
tended that the new House Rule amendment would "enforce
fiscal discipline in Congress."5 Representative Fox asserted that
after the passage of the House Rule, a tax increase could only
happen with "the broad support of Democrats and Republicans
working together when all other reasonable alternatives have
been exhausted."' After heated debate, the resolution passed 279
to 152.'
The purpose of this comment is not to analyze whether the
supermajority requirement is a wise political decision. This will
be left to the political pundits.' Instead, this comment analyzes
whether the House Rule violates the Constitution by removing
the ability of Congress to pass ordinary legislation with a simple
majority vote. It is the constitutionality of the House Rule that is
at issue, not the motives behind it or the purposes of it.
Before a decision on the House Rule's constitutionality can be
reached, however, two hurdles must be overcome. First, a plain-
tiff challenging the House Rule must satisfy the Article III re-
quirements of standing and second, the challenge to the House
Rule must be a justiciable issue. Therefore, in the first section of
this comment, the possible plaintiffs who may assert standing to
challenge the House Rule are discussed. In the second section,
the issue of whether the court should refrain from deciding this
issue as a political question is analyzed.9 Finally, provided that a
4. 141 CONG. REC. H44-45 (daily ed. January 4, 1995) (statement of Repre-
sentative Porter).
5. 141 CONG. REC. H43 (daily ed. January 4, 1995) (statement of Represen-
tative Franks).
6. 141 CONG. REC. H63 (daily ed. January 4, 1995) (statement of Represen-
tative Fox).
7. 141 CONG. REC. H71 (daily ed. January 4, 1995).
8. As the Supreme Court has noted, 'the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule [does not] present any matters for judicial consid-
eration. With the courts the question is only one of power." United States v. Ballin,
144 U.S. 1, 5 (1891).
9. The issues of standing and justiciability have often been misapplied by
courts in its determination of whether a legislator may bring suit in federal court.
See, e.g., Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Standing and justi-
ciability, however, are separate issues and must be addressed as such. Kurtz, 829
F.2d at 1148-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) but cf Moore v. United States House of
Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 961 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that standing involves separation of powers concerns and thus, standing was
intertwined with the political question doctrine). As Justice Ginsburg noted in Kurtz:
[Tihe fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party land] not
on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated .... In other words, when stand-
ing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose
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plaintiff overcomes the hurdles discussed in the first two sec-
tions, the constitutionality of the House Rule is examined.
STANDING
The constitutional standing requirement in Article III limits
the judicial power of the federal courts to the resolution of "cases
and controversies."" Without a case or controversy there is no
standing." Thus, the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears
the burden of proving standing by establishing that he has suf-
fered an injury-in-fact - a "concrete and particularized, actual or
imminent invasion of a legally protected interest." 2 In order to
satisfy Article III and establish standing, a plaintiff must prove,
at a minimum: (i) that he personally suffers some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the
defendant; 3 (ii) that the injury can "fairly be traced to the chal-
lenged action;"' and, (iii) that the injury "is likely to be re-
dressed by a favorable decision. " "
Private Citizen Standing
The first issue that must be addressed is whether a private
citizen can sufficiently allege an injury-in-fact from the enact-
ment of the House Rule which will satisfy the Article III standing
requirements.'" In this instance, the injury to the private citizen
standing is being challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a
particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable.
Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1148-49 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). As for the political question
doctrine, "in contrast to 'standing' law . . . [the political question doctrine is] uncon-
cerned with the identity of the plaintiff and instead focuses on whether the issue is
one appropriate for judicial determination." Id. Because the two issues require sepa-
rate analysis, the issues will be treated separately in this comment.
10. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
11. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 471.
12. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2134 (1992).
13. Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
14. Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976).
15. Simon, 426 U.S. at 38; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1961)
(In order to be a proper party to litigate a claim, the claimant must "allege such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.").
16. The injury must be a "particular concrete injury." United States v. Rich-
ardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974). The injury must also amount to 'a claim of specif-
ic present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm." Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 14 (1972). Further, 'where separation of powers concerns are present, the
plaintiffs alleged injury must be specific and cognizable." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at
474.
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who challenges the House Rule is difficult to define. There are
three different scenarios that could arise, and none of them seem
to injure the private citizen. First, a proposed tax increase could
receive over three-fifths of the vote in the House and pass. Sec-
ond, a proposed tax increase could be voted down by a number of
votes which would have constituted a majority but was not three-
fifths. Third, a proposed tax increase could fail by a number of
votes less than the majority.
In the first instance, where the legislation passes by receiving
three-fifths of the vote, it is difficult for the private citizen to
allege injury because the legislation would have passed in a sim-
ple majority vote. Therefore, the private citizen could not allege
injury further than a normal taxpayer challenging a taxing and
spending action of Congress."
Under the second situation, where the tax increase gains a
majority of the vote but not three-fifths, the private citizen would
be claiming injury because the tax increase would have passed
under the old rule but could not pass under the supermajority
House Rule. The private citizen would essentially be arguing that
by not raising his taxes, he was injured. Needless to say, not
increasing taxes is more of a blessing than an injury.
Finally, the third situation, where the tax increase vote would
fail under either the new or old rule, is similar to the first be-
cause the tax proposal would not have passed under either rule.
Under any of the three situations, it is evident that a change in
the House Rule does not cause an injury to the private citizen,
and therefore, substantiating the first element of standing ap-
pears improbable.
The other two requirements of standing, causation and redress,
would also not be satisfied by a private citizen challenging the
House Rule."8 As for causation, the private citizen would be
challenging not an enactment or law of Congress but an internal
rule. 9 Because this would be a challenge to an internal proce-
dure, the passage of the House Rule or the enactment or failure
17. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
18. Causation is satisfied by establishing that "the consequence of the
defendant's actions" or that the exercise of the courts' remedial powers would redress
the injury. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 45.
19. See Kurtz, 829 F.2d at 1140. There is an issue however of whether the
plaintiff may assert taxpayer standing because the House Rule clearly influences the
taxing and spending power of Congress. As was held in Flast v. Cohen, private citi-
zens may have standing to. challenge "exercises of congressional power" that arise
from Congress' taxing and spending power. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102
(1968). However, the ability of a private citizen to show a distinct and concrete
injury would be a major obstacle in asserting a claim against the House Rule.
Vol. 33:959
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of a bill to pass because of the House Rule is not causally linked
to the private citizen's alleged injury. Further, because rescinding
the House Rule by a court would not relieve a plaintiff of any
alleged injury, and would not lend itself to judicial redress, but
would merely affect congressional procedures, the element of re-
dress cannot be sufficiently satisfied.
Because of his inability to exhibit a palpable injury, the only
way a private citizen can exhibit a legally cognizable injury is
through his legislator. The private citizen's injury must derive
from his legislator's dilution of voting power.2" This type of de-
rivative standing has been approved by federal courts.2'
Legislator Standing
Courts have asserted that legislators and private citizens
should be treated similarly under the standing doctrine.22 Be-
cause of the separation of powers concerns, however, few courts
have actually done so.2 Instead, courts have dismissed legisla-
tor suits under the principle of equitable discretion." As noted
previously, however, standing must be addressed separately from
justiciability, therefore, the same principles applied to private
citizens in the previous section must be applied to legislators to
determine whether they have standing to challenge the House
Rule.2"
An analysis of legislator standing cases indicates that a
legislator's standing is dependent upon whether he can sufficient-
ly allege that his vote has been made less effective.2" In
20. See Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
21. See, e.g., Michel, 14 F.3d at 626. In Michel the court asserted, "[vioters
have standing to challenge practices that are claimed to dilute their vote, such as
being placed in a voting district that is significantly more populous than others. It
does not matter that their claim derives from their legislator." Id.
22. See Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Riegle v.
Federal Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Reuss v. Balles,
584 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir.
1977) ("[Tlhere are no special standards for determining Congressional standing
questions.").
23. See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 877; Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374,
1381-82 (D. D.C. 1986).
24. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 882.
25. See note 9 for a discussion of the difference between standing and justicia-
bility.
26. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939); Risser v. Thompson, 930
F.2d 549, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1991); Moore v. United States House of Representatives,
733 F.2d 946, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 433 (D.C. Cir.
1974); but see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 n.4 (1983) (agreeing without
discussion that a Nebraska legislator had standing as a legislator and as a taxpayer
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Coleman v. Miller,27 twenty state senators challenged the consti-
tutionality of a provision that allowed the lieutenant governor to
cast a tie breaking vote in a constitutional amendment ratifica-
tion.28 The defendants challenged the senator's standing to as-
sert the claim.29 The Supreme Court disagreed with the defen-
dants and asserted that the senators had standing." The Court
contended that if the senator's alleged constitutional violation
was found to be accurate, their votes would have been "virtually
held for naught."'" Because the senators had a "plain, direct and
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,"
the Court held that they had standing to assert the claim.32
In Kennedy v. Sampson," Senator Kennedy filed suit against
the Administrator of the General Services Administration and
the Chief of White House Records and alleged that the
President's pocket veto of the Family Practice and Medicine Act
violated Senator Kennedy's right to vote to override the veto. 4
In determining that Senator Kennedy had standing to assert the
claim, the court contended that Senator Kennedy's injury was
that his vote in favor of the bill in question had been nullified."5
Therefore, because the effectiveness of his vote was diminished,
the court held that Senator Kennedy had standing to assert his
claim.38
In Moore v. United States House of Representatives,7 eighteen
members of the House of Representatives challenged the consti-
tutionality of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act.8
The representatives asserted that the law was unconstitutional
to challenge the opening prayer at legislative sessions).
27. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
28. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
29. Id. at 438.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Justice Frankfurter, who concurred in the judgment, but did not agree
that the senators had standing, chastised the majority for determining that the state
senators exhibited a particularized injury. Id. at 465 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter asserted that "[by as much right could a member of Congress
who had voted against the passage of a bill because moved by constitutional
scruples urge before this Court our duty to consider his arguments of unconstitu-
tionality." Id. He further contended that "[o]ne who is merely the self-constituted
spokesman of a constitutional point of view can not ask us to pass on it." Id. at
467.
33. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
34. Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 433.
35. Id. at 436.
36. Id.
37. 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
38. Moore, 733 F.2d at 948.
Vol. 33:959
1995 Comments 965
because it originated in the Senate and not in the House. 9 The
court held that the representatives did have standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the act.4"
In determining that the plaintiffs had standing, the court con-
tended that the representatives had to satisfy four requirements
to assert their claim: "(1) the congressional claimants [have]
suffered an injury in fact (2) to an interest protected by the Origi-
nation Clause, (3) which injury was caused by the defendants'
actions, and (4) which injury could be redressed by a favorable
decision of the court."4' Under the first requirement, injury, the
court concluded that because the representatives showed a "de-
privation of an opportunity to debate and vote on the origination
of [the bill] in the House" and "specific injury in their official
capacities as members of the House by the nullification of their
right to originate, by debate and vote, a bill for raising revenue,"
they satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.42 The court con-
tended that the injury of vote diminution was adequately particu-
lar to legislators as compared to a generalized complaint of
governmental impropriety.' The court further asserted that the
fact that every member of the House could claim injury from the
action did not defeat the legislator's standing." The court main-
tained that the legislator need not be the "most grievously in-
jured," but only was required to be "among the injured."45
39. Id. at 948. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (the Origination Clause).
40. Moore, 733 F.2d at 954.
41. Id. at 950.
42. Id. at 951. The court further noted that because the plaintiffs were indi-
vidual members of Congress, their rights that were injured were defined by the
Constitution. Id.; see also Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that eight members of the Virgin Islands legislature had standing because "the right
to advise and consent has been vested only in members of the legislature, and since
only members of the legislature are bringing this action, the allegation that this
right has been usurped . .. [is] sufficiently personal to constitute an injury in fact").
The dissent, written by Justice Scalia, quarrelled with the majority on this point.
See Moore, 733 F.2d at 959 (Scalia, J. dissenting). Justice Scalia contended that the
representatives had no private right created by the Constitution in their offices. Id.
He asserted that the powers of the office belonged to the people, not the represen-
tatives. Id. Therefore, a representative could not allege any injury. Id. Justice Scalia,
however, combined his analysis of standing with an analysis of the separation of
powers issue.
43. Moore, 733 F.2d at 951; cf. Southern Christian Leadership Conference v.
Kelley, 747 F.2d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan,
738 F.2d 1375, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1984); American Federation of Government Employ-
ees v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190,
208 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a legislator's interest in the unlawful acts of gov-
ernment were only general grievances about the conduct of government, therefore
were not sufficient to allege injury).
44. Moore, 733 F.2d at 952; see also Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-
36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
45. Moore, 733 F.2d at 952 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-
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Some courts, however, have been unwilling to allow legislators
to have standing when the court believes that the legislator is
merely avenging a political loss and not alleging an actual vote
or power diminishment. For example, in Davids v. Akers,"s six-
teen state congressional plaintiffs from Arizona challenged the
majority party's allocation of committee seats."7 The minority
party claimed that the disproportionate amount of seats given to
the minority party discriminated against them.48 The court was
not persuaded that this political discrimination exhibited a legal-
ly cognizable injury.4' The court contended, that:
It is true that, like the elector, the member has one vote as a member of
the House. Nothing in the record, however, suggests that his vote is
different from that of each other member. He has no more right to have
other members vote with him than an elector has to have other electors
vote with him. Neither has a right to win. Each has a right to have his
vote counted the same weight as every other vote. That, the member
has.... [The plaintiffs] were voted down, but the Federal Constitution
does not give them as a majority party, the right to win.'
Therefore, without the vote diminishment, the minority party
was dismissed for lack of standing.5'
In a factually similar case, Jagt v. O'Neill,52 fourteen mem-
bers of the United States House of Representatives sued the ma-
jority leadership alleging that they were discriminated against in
the allocation of House committee and subcommittee seats."
The plaintiffs brought suit as: (1) Republican members of the
House; (2) all members of certain committees; and (3) voters in
districts represented by Republicans."' In contrast to the Davids
32 (1972)). After a lengthy discussion regarding injury, the court briefly discussed
the other three standing requirements and found them to be satisfied. Moore, 733
F.2d at 953-54. As to the causation requirement, the court noted that the "unwill-
ingness of a majority of the members to reject [the billl after the allegedly unconsti-
tutional origination of the bill . . . cannot deprive the appellants - minority mem-
bers of the House - of their right to participate in a constitutionally proscribed
method of enacting . . . legislation." Id.
46. 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977).
47. Davids, 549 F.2d at 122.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 126. The court, however, mistakenly analyzed the injury to the
plaintiffs under a section discussing political questions and separation of powers.
50. Id. The court further noted that, "tlo us, the picture of a Federal Judge
undertaking to tell the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives how many
Democrats, and perhaps even which Democrats, he is to appoint to the standing
committees . . . of the House is startlingly unattractive." Id. at 123.
51. Id. at 127.
52. 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
53. Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1167.
54. Id. at 1167 n.1.
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court, the court in Jagt held that the representatives did have
standing to assert their claim.5 The court asserted that because
the representatives could show, as congressional voters, that
their vote had been diluted, they had alleged a distinct injury
capable of redress."
Courts have also determined that the causation element exists
for legislators to satisfy standing requirements. In Riegle v. Fed-
eral Open Market Committee,7 a United States Senator chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve Act.' The
senator alleged that because members of the Reserve Bank voted
as members of the Federal Open Market Committee, they were
Executive Branch officers. 9 The senator claimed that the ap-
pointment of these officers without the senator's confirmation
vote deprived him, as a senator, of a constitutional right to ap-
prove appointment of executive branch officials.6" The court held
that the senator did have standing to challenge the action.6' The
court asserted that because the remedial powers of the court
could redress the injury that the senator alleged, he had shown
enough causation to satisfy standing. 2
The cases concerning legislator standing clearly exhibit that if
a legislator wishes to challenge the House Rule, he must show
injury through the effect of the House Rule on his vote. There is
an open issue, however, of whether the legislator must show a
nullification of his vote,63 or need only show that his vote has
been diluted.' The next issue, therefore, is whether the House
Rule nullifies or dilutes a representative's vote.
The best scenario for a congressman to challenge the House
Rule would require more than a majority but less than three-
fifths of the House to vote in favor of a tax proposal.' In this
55. Id. at 1170.
56. Id. The court explicitly noted that a legislator could be determined to have
standing based solely on the dilution of his vote. Id. The court did not require that
the legislator show that his vote had been "nullified." Id.; cf. Goldwater v. Carter,
617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
57. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
58. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 874.
59. Id. at 877.
60. Id. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2 (the Appointments Clause).
61. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878-79.
62. Id.
63. See Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J.,
concurring) ("[An alleged diminution in congressional influence must amount to a
disenfranchisement - a nullification or diminution of a congressman's vote - before
a congressional plaintiff may claim the requisite injury-in-fact necessary to confer
standing to sue.").
64. See Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1168.
65. The individual representative, of course, would have to vote for the reject-
1995
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case, the bill would have passed by a simple majority, but not
under the new supermajority House Rule. Thus, the represen-
tative could claim that the change in the House Rule diminished
his vote because it rendered what would have been a winning
vote into a losing vote. Also, the requirement of a three-fifths
majority to pass the resolution gives a negative vote one and one-
half the force of an affirmative vote."' This change in voting pro-
cedure from majority to supermajority would clearly dilute a
representative's vote and would be sufficient to establish injury.
The challenge to the House Rule would be more difficult, how-
ever, if the court required that the representative exhibit a nulli-
fication of his vote. 7 In contrast to Kennedy and Riegle, the
House Rule does not deny a representative the right to vote on
an issue.' Instead, the representative's vote has only been di-
luted. Thus, whether the court requires a nullification of the
representative's vote is critical in the determination of a
representative's injury."
Along with asserting that the House Rule dilutes a
representative's right to cast a full and effective vote, a legislator
plaintiff could also allege that a congressional member has a
right to vote as prescribed in Article I, section 77o Thus, if Arti-
cle I, section 7 requires that decisions on legislation by the House
may only be made by a majority, the House Rule infringes on a
House member's constitutionally prescribed voting rights.7' Fur-
ther, the representative could assert that a House Rule which
requires a supermajority vote on revenue legislation also inter-
feres with the representative's power to enact laws regarding
ed proposal.
66. This argument was put forth by the plaintiffs in Lance v. Board of Educa-
tion in challenging a West Virginia 60% voter requirement to issue bond indebted-
ness. See Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E.2d 783, 786 (W. Va. 1969), rev'd,
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). This dilution was the basis of the plaintiffs
argument that the 60% requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause. Lance, 170
S.E.2d at 786-87; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
67. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
68. See Riegle, 656 F.2d at 878; Kennedy, 511 F.2d at 433.
69. See Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1357 (Bork, J. concurring) ("Congressional
plaintiffs here have lost no part of their right to vote" therefore they could not be
said to have suffered any injury.).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. Article 1, section 7 prescribes the method in
which bills become law. Id.
71. See Dennis v. Luis, 741 F.2d 628, 630 (3d Cir. 1984); Risser v. Thompson,
930 F.2d 549, 554 (7th Cir. 1991); Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605, 607
(D. D.C. 1988) ("[Tlhe law accords standing to legislators who have alleged an injury
to their constitutional rights or duties."); United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738
F.2d 1375, 1381 (D. D.C. 1984) ("A member of Congress may have standing where
he alleges a 'specific and cognizable [injuryl arising out of an interest positively
identified in the Constitution.' ").
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federal spending. These interferences with a legislator's constitu-
tional right could also establish adequate injury-in-fact to satisfy
the standing requirements.72
The more plausible theory on which to challenge the House
Rule, however, is the dilution of the representative's voting pow-
er.73 Assuming that the court determines that the dilution of the
representative's vote is an adequate injury-in-fact to satisfy the
standing requirements, the next issue is whether the court will
decide the merits of the case, or will defer to the judgment of a
co-equal branch. Thus, the issue is whether the political question
and separation of powers doctrines require that a court refrain
from adjudicating the merits of the case.
JUSTICIABILITY
Although courts have decided that legislators have satisfied
the standing requirements of Article III in order to bring a claim,
many courts have declined to address the merits of the claim be-
cause of the political question and separation of powers doctrines,
or based upon the equitable or remedial discretion of the court.74
Refraining from a decision based on remedial or equitable
discretion is addressed first.
72. Whether the assertion that these constitutional rights provided for con-
gressman have been invaded enough to exhibit injury will depend on the court's
willingness to find that right positively identified in the Constitution. As the District
Court for the District of Columbia noted, however, an interest in a congressional
right that could be interpreted as arising out of the Constitution was a "congressio-
nal interest in having all laws made in the manner proscribed under the general
law making provision contained in Article I [section] 7." Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374, 1382 (D. D.C. 1986).
73. A vote dilution argument clearly establishes the injury-in-fact in that the
representative's vote has clearly been diminished. To argue that the representative's
right to vote in accordance with Article I, section 7 would be a more difficult asser-
tion in that Article I, section 7 fails to mention specifically how congressional voting
should commence.
However, as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted:
Never has it heretofore been suggested . . . that specific injury to a
legislator in his official capacity is not a cognizable harm in the federal courts.
In each congressional standing case before this court, the inquiry has properly
focused on whether the harm to the legislator is definable and discernable in
determining whether a congressional plaintiff has standing. . . . [We have
held that an unconstitutional deprivation[] of a legislator's constitutional duties
or rights, such as the nullification of a legislator's vote . . . may give rise to
standing if the injuries are specific and discernible.
Moore, 733 F.2d at 952.
74. See, e.g., Riegle, 656 F.2d at 882.
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Equitable Discretion
Regardless of standing, many courts, especially in the District
of Columbia circuit, have refused to adjudicate legislator claims
relying upon a remedial or equitable discretion approach. The
remedial discretion approach was employed by the courts in an
effort to stave off the increasing number of suits brought by legis-
lators who had failed to convince their colleagues in Congress to
vote their way.75 The approach was first adopted by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Riegle v. Federal Open
Market Committee."
In Riegle, the court asserted that remedial discretion should be
exercised when "a congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial
relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal,
or amendment of a statute."77 The Riegle court contended that
because the dispute was primarily with a representative's other
colleagues, the court should not review congressional practices
and procedures as to "affect the way Congress does business.""
The next issue, therefore, is whether a representative challeng-
ing the House Rule could survive a court's exercise of equitable
discretion. It is asserted that the legislator plaintiff can survive
equitable discretion if two steps are taken. First, after bringing
the claim based upon vote dilution, the suit must be joined by
constituents of the member's district.79 By joining private citi-
75. See Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In Gregg, the
court noted:
[Individual members of Congress seek to vent their frustration with their col-
leagues, or with the executive branch, or both, by appeals to the courts. It has
become a growing phenomenon to see individual members of Congress chal-
lenge actions or failures to act as violations of the members' interests as legis-
lators.
Gregg, 771 F.2d at 543; see also Moore v. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946,
956 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Leach v. Resolution Trust Corp., 860 F. Supp. 868, 874 (D.
D.C. 1994).
76. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The origin of remedial discretion was an
article written by Judge Carl McGowan. See Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court:
The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981).
77. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
78. Id. The court noted, however, that:
We would welcome congressional plaintiff actions involving non-frivolous claims
of unconstitutional action which, because they could not be brought by a pri-
vate plaintiff and are not subject to legislative redress, would go unreviewed
unless brought by a legislative plaintiff. In this last situation, there are no
prudential concerns which would outweigh the mandate of the federal courts
to "say what the law is."
Id. at 882 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
79. As was noted in the section on private citizen standing, a private citizen's
ability to exhibit the required injury to support standing is derivative from their
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zens in the action, equitable discretion will not apply and the
court can not dismiss the claim on that basis."0
The second step for the legislator plaintiff to avoid dismissal of
his claim due to equitable discretion is to exhaust all other avail-
able redress through his colleagues. The legislator must attempt
to amend the House Rule, or have it suspended before litigation
can be brought. To amend or suspend the House Rule would
require a unanimous vote of the House, and although suspension
of House rules is a common occurrence in the daily legislative
process, there is no guarantee that a rule may be suspended.8 1
Further, if the Speaker refuses to entertain the motion, the point
of order can be overturned by a majority of the House. 2 Thus,
the minimum action by a legislator before judicially challenging
the House Rule is to attempt to amend or suspend the House
Rule and thus exhibit to the court that no method of redress
remained available through his colleagues.
Provided that the legislator plaintiff can survive the equitable
discretion of the court, the next issue that must be addressed is
whether the court will avoid adjudication of the claim based on
the political question doctrine.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
In Baker v. Carr,' the Supreme Court set forth that a ques-
tion was non-justiciable when there was:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.'
In his concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter,' Justice Powell sum-
representative's dilution of voting power. See Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 626
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
80. See Michel, 14 F.3d at 628; Gregg, 771 F.2d at 546.
81. Stanley Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 738
(1989).
82. Bach, cited at note 81, at 740. However, the Speaker's "rulings are rarely
appealed and are never overruled in contemporary practice." Id.
83. 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
84. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
85. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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marized the political question doctrine into three "inquiries,"
namely, "(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions com-
mitted by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of
government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a
court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential
considerations counsel against judicial intervention?"86 These
critical factors will be discussed separately to determine whether
a court should refraii from hearing a challenge to the House
Rule.
A Textual Commitment to a Coordinate Branch of Government
Whether there has been a textual commitment to a coordinate
branch of government requires that the challenged constitutional
power first be examined to determine if it is subject to judicial
review. 7 Thus, the first inquiry is whether judging the constitu-
tionality of the House Rule is a function of constitutional inter-
pretation of a congressional power or is an interpretation of a
constitutional provision. This determination is essential because
if it is a congressional power that is being interpreted, the court
will usually abide by the discretion of the coordinate branch."
However, if it is a matter of a conflict with a fixed term or provi-
sion in the United States Constitution, courts will adjudicate the
claim.89
This principle is exemplified by analyzing two Supreme Court
cases, Nixon v. United States,' and Powell v. McCormack." In
Nixon, the Court held that the constitutional grant to the Senate
of the "sole power to try impeachments" made non-justiciable the
question of whether the Senate could employ a committee to hear
impeachment evidence.2 In Powell, the Court held that despite
Congress's constitutional power to determine the "Qualifications
of Members of Congress," the House could not refuse to seat an
elected congressman because Article I, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion defined the qualifications of a member and, therefore, the
House could not add to them.93
86. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969).
88. Powell, 395 U.S. at 520.
89. Id.; see also Leach v. Resolution Trust Corp., 860 F. Supp. 868, 872 (D.
D.C. 1994) (determining that the interpretation of "Congress" in the Congressional
Savings Clause was statutory interpretation for the court and therefore not a politi-
cal question intruding on the oversight function of Congress).
90. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
91. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
92. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735-36. See also U.S. CONST. art III, § 3, cl. 6.
93. Powell, 395 U.S. at 548.
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In upholding the validity of Powell, the court in Nixon noted
that the Powell decision was justiciable because the definition of
"Qualifications" was limited by the Constitution.9 Thus, there
was not a textual commitment to the House of Representatives to
determine the qualifications of membership.' The Court distin-
guished the situation in Nixon because Nixon involved no sepa-
rate Constitutional provision to determine the term "try" as pro-
vided in Article I, section 3, clause 6.' Therefore, the Senate
had sole, unreviewable discretion to interpret the method of try-
ing impeachments. 7
Therefore, the issue is whether the Article I, section 5 provi-
sion allowing that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings""8 is a textual commitment to the legislative branch,
or is limited by other constitutional provisions. In other words,
does the Constitution specifically limit the rule making power of
the House, in that, it may not make a rule changing the vote
requirement for the passage of ordinary legislation? If the Consti-
tution does provide that the business of the House in passing
legislation may only be done by a majority, then the courts would
be free to decide whether the House Rule is constitutional. This
would not be a political question. If, however, the Constitution
does not provide for only a simple majority to pass ordinary legis-
lation in the House, then the court should be refrained from
determining the constitutionality of the House Rule. This would
be a political question.
To resolve this question of whether a challenge to the House
Rule is justiciable, the scope of the authority conferred upon the
House to determine its rules must be analyzed. The language of
Article I, section 5, clause 2 is relatively straightforward. The
clause simply provides that, "[elach House may determine the
Rules of its Proceedings."' At first blush, this appears to be a
clear textual commitment to another branch of government.
Thus, any interpretation by the judiciary of an action of Congress
based upon this constitutional provision would be unreviewable.
However, this is not the case. The history of challenges against a
94. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739-40. See also U.S. CONST. art I, § 2.
95. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740. Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that "[tihe de-
cision as to whether a member satisfied these qualifications was placed within the
House, but the decision as to what these qualifications consisted of was not." Id.
(alteration in original).
96. Id. Article I, section 3, clause 6 provides that, "[t]he Senate shall have the
sole Power to try all Impeachments." U.S. CONST. art 1, § 3, cl. 6.
97. Nixon, 113 S. Ct at 740.




house rule provide that the claim against the rule is justiciable if
the challenge is to the constitutionality of the rule.
This principle originated in United States v. Ballin."'° In
BaUin, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a law
had been effectively passed by a quorum of the House of Repre-
sentatives as required in Article I, section 5, clause 1.101 In de-
termining that the law had been effectively passed, the court
noted that the requirement that a majority of the House mem-
bers be present to constitute a quorum was not subject to dis-
pute."0 2 However, the method of reaching a majority was a mat-
ter of interpretation solely designated to the legislative
branch.' Thus, in Ballin, because the method for determining
a majority did not violate the quorum requirement, and a majori-
ty was actually present at the time of the vote, the provision was
legally passed. 104
The Ballin court was explicit, however, in its assertion that
House rules were subject to review if the rule violated a provision
of the Constitution.' 1 The Court stated:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceed-
ings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between
the mode or methods of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. '
The Court reiterated, however, that the "wisdom or folly" of the
rule was not subject to judicial consideration.'.
The decision by the Supreme Court in Ballin has led to the
principle that Article I, section 5, clause 2, does not bar all judi-
cial inquiry into the constitutional validity of a rule,' 8 but only
100. 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
101. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 6. The Court contended that, "[t]he Constitution has prescribed no
method of making this determination, and it is therefore within the competency of
the house to prescribe any method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain
[the presence of a majority]." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5.
107. Id.
108. See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963) ("It has long been
settled, of course, that rules of Congress . . . are judicially cognizable."); Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 663 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michel v. Anderson, 14
F.3d 623, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("It is true, as the appellants point out, that this court has found no
absolute prohibition of judicial review in the clause, adjacent to the Elections Clause,
which stated that '[elach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.' "); Jagt
v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982); CNN v. Anderson, 723 F. Supp.
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prohibits another branch of government from instructing Con-
gress on what rules it may adopt."0 9 Further, if a private citizen
is joined in the action claiming that their representative's vote
has been diluted, courts will adjudicate a claim because the con-
stitutionality of the rule affected persons outside of members of
Congress."'
In challenging the House Rule, the claim passes the textual
commitment obstacle of Baker v. Carr. The determination of
whether the House Rule violates the Constitution does not re-
quire judicial inquiry into Congress's interpretation of their own
rules. Rather, it involves a justiciable challenge to the conflict
between the supermajority requirement and the constitutional
history of requiring only a simple majority to pass ordinary legis-
lation. Thus, this decision by the judiciary on the House Rule
does not violate the political question doctrine or the separation
of powers as it has been interpreted by the courts."' The next
issue, therefore, is whether other aspects of the political question
doctrine bar adjudication of the claim.
Judicially Manageable Standards
The political question doctrine further requires that a court
have manageable standards to address a challenge to the House
Rule. In this situation, the court need only look to the Constitu-
tion to determine whether the House Rule should stand. As the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted in Dyer
v. Blair:"2
835, 837 (D. D.C. 1989).
109. Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1173 ("Article I simply means that neither we nor the
Executive Branch may tell Congress what rules it must adopt. Article I does not
alter our judicial responsibility to say what rules Congress may not adopt because of
constitutional infirmity."); Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 589 F.2d 582, 590
(D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Although the courts will intervene to protect constitutional rights
from infringement by Congress, including its committees and members . . . where
constitutional rights are not violated, there is no warrant for the judiciary to inter-
fere with the internal procedures of Congress."); CNN, 723 F. Supp. at 838.
110. See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932) (asserting that if a rule
affects a person other than members of the Senate "the question presented is of
necessity a judicial one"); see also Yellin, 374 U.S. at 143; Metzenbaum v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
111. There is an additional argument, however, that the term "passed" in Arti-
cle I, section 7, clause 2 is unreviewable judgment of Congress. See U.S. CONST. art
I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that, [elvery Bill which shall have passed the House of Rep-
resentatives"). This provision, however, does not exhibit a textual commitment to
Congress to determine how bills should "pass." Thus, the argument is without merit
and would not bar adjudication of a claim against the House Rule.
112. 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Il1. 1975).
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It is primarily the character of the standards, not merely the difficulty of
their application, that differentiates between those which are political
and those which are judicial. The mere fact that a court has little or
nothing but the language of the Constitution as a guide to its interpreta-
tion does not mean that the task of construction is judicially unmanage-
able. 3
A determination on the constitutional validity of the House
Rule would not require the court to fashion a new House Rule or
tell the House what the new House rule should be. The court's
only duty would be to "say what the law is" and rule according-
ly.
114
Interbranch Conflict and Embarrassment
A further argument in favor of classifying the litigation as a
political question would be that judicial resolution of this issue
would only produce a potentially embarrassing confrontation
between coordinate branches of government."' However, "[sluch
a determination falls within the traditional role accorded courts
to interpret the law and does not involve a 'lack of respect due [a]
coordinate [branch] of government.' 116
Judicial Intrusion into Broad Congressional Authority
A final argument in favor of dismissing the action based on the
political question doctrine would be that the Article I, section 5
grant of power is a source of broad authority for Congress, and
intrusion into this broad authority results in a non-justiciable
question. This argument was best addressed by the dissent in
Nixon v. United States,' which countered:
This assignment of power [Art. I, § 5, cl. 21 like the assignment of power
to Congress to regulate interstate commerce or to provide for the general
113. Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1302.
114. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also United
States v. Rostenkowski, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *18 (D. D.C. October 14, 1994)
(holding that there were "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for inter-
preting the meaning of the term "official" in the House rule restricting paid congres-
sional employees to those with "official duties").
115. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
116. Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1301 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). The Dyer
court further noted that "folur system of government requires that federal courts on
occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction
given to the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adju-
dication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibil-
ity." Dyer, 390 F. Supp. at 1301.
117. 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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welfare, may be exercised only within constraints of the Constitution.
The Senate could not, for example, constitutionally pass a "rule" allowing
conviction and removal of impeached officials by a majority vote and the
fact that the Senate's action had been taken pursuant to its "rule mak-
ing" authority would provide no shield against judicial invalidation."'
Because judicial determination of whether the House Rule is
valid is not barred by the political questions doctrine, the final
task is to discuss the constitutionality of the House Rule.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Gordon v. Lance
In the debates before the passage of the House Rule, some
legislators supported the constitutionality of the House Rule
alleging that the "Supreme Court blessed the constitutionality of
supermajority restraints on the taxing and spending propensities
of government in Gordon v. Lance.""9 Because of this reliance,
Gordon v. Lance must be addressed first.
In Gordon v. Lance,2 ' the West Virginia Constitution and
state statutes provided that political subdivisions of the state
could not incur bond indebtedness or increase tax rates unless
sixty percent of the voters approved of the action in a referendum
election.' 2' A bond indebtedness was then proposed and placed
on the ballot.' At the referendum election, 51.55% of the vot-
ers were in favor of the bond indebtedness. 2 ' Because the votes
only consisted of a majority and not the required supermajority,
the referendum was voted down.'24 Some citizens of West Vir-
ginia who voted in favor of the referendum brought suit and
alleged that the sixty percent requirement violated the Equal
Protection Clause." 5 The West Virginia trial court dismissed
the voters claim, but the Supreme Court of West Virginia re-
versed and held that the sixty percent requirement violated equal
118. Nixon, 938 F.2d at 256 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
119. 141 CONG. REC. H64 (daily ed. January 4, 1995) (statement of Represen-
tative Saxton) (quoting Bruce Fein, Solomon's wise House discipline; Tax increase
limitations, WASHINGTON TIMES, December 20, 1994, at A16).
120. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
121. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 2.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The plaintiffs contended that the 60% requirement diluted their vote
because a negative vote had "one and one-half the force of an affirmative vote and
that, therefore, two negative votes have the force of three affirmative votes." Lance
v. Board of Education, 170 S.E.2d 783, 786 (W. Va. 1969), rev'd, Gordon v. Lance,




The Supreme Court reversed the West Virginia court."7 Be-
cause the voters alleged an equal protection violation, the Court
began its analysis by addressing cases of vote dilution and
abridgement." The Court then asserted that the voters in this
case could not claim that they had been denied access to the bal-
lot.129 The Court acknowledged that action by the legislature
under supermajority rules made the passage of legislation more
difficult,3 ' and that supermajority rule allowed a minority to
have disproportionate power over a majority.'' However, the
Court asserted that "there is nothing in the language of the Con-
stitution, our history, or our cases that requires that a majority
prevail on every issue."2 The Court concluded, therefore, that
as long as the supermajority provision did not discriminate
against an identifiable class, it could not violate equal protec-
tion.'33
Whether Gordon is dispositive on the constitutionality of the
House Rule is subject to debate. Certainly, there is strong lan-
guage in the opinion suggesting that majority rule is not the sole
method of procedure in a constitutional framework.' The
Court, however, did clarify the scope of its holding.' The Court
noted:
We intimate no view on the constitutionality of a provision requiring
unanimity or giving veto power to a very small group. Nor do we decide
whether a State may, consistently with the Constitution, require extraor-
dinary majorities for the election of public officers."s
This language by the Court is important for two reasons. First,
126. Lance, 170 S.E.2d at 791. The court asserted that the 60 percent require-
ment diluted the plaintiffs vote and violated the Equal Protection Clause require-
ment of "one person, one vote." Id. at 790-91.
127. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 8.
128. Id. at 5 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
129. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5.
130. Id. at 5-6. The voters alleged that because the bond indebtedness was not
approved, the schools in the Roane County area had been unimproved since 1946
and had fell below the state average in size and facilities. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 6.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 7. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented and agreed with the
West Virginia Supreme Court who decided that the 60% requirement diluted the
citizen's votes. Id. at 8 (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. See Gordon, 403 U.S. at 6.




it exemplifies that in Gordon, the Court was focusing specifically
on whether a supermajority requirement in a referendum elec-
tion was constitutional. Because the Court is clearly focusing on
referendum and popular elections, it difficult to argue that the
Gordon decision is dispositive of the constitutionality of a House
Rule requiring a supermajority to pass simple legislation.'37
Second, the language indicates that the Gordon Court was not
persuaded by the plaintiffs argument that the supermajority
requirement in a referendum election gave unconstitutionally
disproportionate power to a minority of citizens."3 However, the
Court reserved the right to invalidate statutes that would place a
minority in a superior position to the majority.139 This language
is critical because the concern of placing veto power in the hands
of "very small group" was the exact concern the Framers of the
Constitution envisioned, when determining that supermajority
requirements not be included in the Constitution. 0
Another point of distinction between the challenge of the
House Rule and the challenge to the referendum election in
Gordon is the basis upon which the claim would be brought. In
Gordon, the citizens who lost the referendum election brought
suit based upon an alleged violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.' Therefore, the analysis by the Supreme Court was
based exclusively on interpretation of vote dilution and abridg-
ment jurisprudence.' If a claim is brought by a private citizen
challenging the House Rule, the allegation of vote dilution would
be similar. The private citizen would be alleging that through
their representative, their influence has been diminished because
his influence was diminished. However, if the suit is properly
brought by a legislator, the issue would be markedly different.
If the legislator alleged that his vote in Congress had been
diminished or nullified, the Court would not analyze the issue
under the Equal Protection Clause. This is because the
legislator's alleged injury would be based on a right to vote estab-
lished in the Constitution, not a Fourteenth Amendment right of
access to the voting process. Thus, the cases involving discrimina-
137. See 141 CONG. REC. H64 (daily ed. January 4, 1995) (statement of Rep-
resentative Saxton) (quoting Fein, cited at note 119, at A16).
138. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 6.
139. Id. at 8 n.6.
140. See THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 396-97 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
141. Gordon, 403 U.S. at 3.
142. Id. at 5 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960)).
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tory bars to voting would not be applicable, and the issue would
be the ability of Congress to alter through a rule, the constitu-
tional procedures for passing simple legislation.
Although the Gordon Court does appear to reserve judgment
on the entire supermajority issue and its constitutionality,' 3
the Court did recognize that supermajority requirements existed
in the states at that time.'" It is clear that the Court did not
look with disdain on these state supermajority requirements;
however, it is also clear that the discussion by the Court centered
on the state's interest and the state's discretion."' This discus-
sion would be irrelevant under a challenge strictly based on the
United States Constitution and the appropriate starting point for
a court's analysis in a challenge to the House Rule would be with
the intent of the Framers of the United States Constitution. The
Framer's intent, therefore, is the next step in the analysis of the
constitutionality of the House Rule.
Framer's Intent
To determine whether the House Rule is constitutional, the
discussion must begin with the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution. During the original constitutional debates, the
recurring question that the Framers discussed was not whether a
majority should decide an issue, but when it should be required
that a supermajority decide an issue." Alexander Hamilton ac-
knowledged that the "[flundamental maxim of republican govern-
ment... [is] that the sense of the majority should prevail.""7
The Framers feared that any supermajority requirement in ordi-
nary legislation would place the majority at the will of the minor-
ity.
In the Federalist, James Madison wrote:
It has been said that more than a majority ought to have been required
143. See Gordon, 403 U.S. at 8 n.6.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id. The Court noted:
The constitutions of many States prohibit or severely limit the power of the
legislature to levy new taxes or to create or increase bond indebtedness, there-
by insulating entire areas from majority control. Whether these matters of
finance and taxation are to be considered less "important" than matters of
treaties, foreign policy, or impeachment of public officers is more properly left
to the determination by the States and the people than to the courts under
the -broad mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
146. See 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 262 (1941).
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 139 (Alexander Hamilton).
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for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not all, more than a majority of
a quorum for a decision. That some advantages might have resulted from
such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional
shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to
hasty and partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by
the inconvenience in the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the
general good might require new laws to be passed, or active measures to
be pursued, the fundamental principle of free government would be re-
versed. It would no longer be the majority that would rule; the power
would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege lim-
ited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of
it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifice of the general weal, or in
particular exigencies to exhort unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would
facilitate and foster baneful practice sessions; a practice which has shewn
itself even in the states where a majority only is required; a practice
subversive of all the principles of order and regular government; a prac-
tice which leads more directly to public convulsions, and the ruin of pop-
ular governments, than any other which has yet been displayed among
US. 148
Alexander Hamilton also feared the power of the minority to
disrupt democratic rule and asserted:
To give a minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the
case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision) is in its ten-
dency to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser
number.... [I]ts real operation is to embarrass the administration, to
destroy the energy of government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice
or artifice of an insignificant, turbulent or corrupt junto, to the regular
deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. In those emergen-
cies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or
strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is com-
monly a necessity for action .... If a pertinacious minority respecting the
best mode of conducting it; the majority in order that something may be
done, must conform to the views of the minority; and thus the sense of
the smaller number will over-rule that of the greater, and give a tone to
the national proceedings. ... It is often, by the impracticability of ob-
taining the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state
of inaction. Its situation must always savour of weakness - sometimes
border upon anarchy."'
At the debates in the federal convention, the Framers dis-
cussed periodically the need for a supermajority vote only in
certain instances.15 ° One telling discussion involved Article 7,
section 6 of the Articles of Confederation.' Article 7, section 6
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 396-97 (James Madison).
149. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 140-41 (Alexander Hamilton).
150. ELLIOT, cited at note 146, at 349 (discussing and approving of the legisla-
tive override of a presidential veto by two-thirds of each branch and approving a
provision that two-thirds of the Senate approve judges nominated by the executive).




[No act of the legislature for the purpose of regulating the commerce of
the United States with the foreign powers, among the several states,
shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members of each
house. '5
The delegates to the convention rejected the section in ques-
tion.' They asserted that not only could the provision cause
embarrassment, it would also place the majority at the will of the
minority.'54 Further, Madison noted that the two-thirds require-
ment was not needed with the further checks and balances of
government. 6' He believed that an abuse of power was not
probable with the independence of the Senate and the negative of
the Executive Branch.
156
Both in the discussions of the Constitution and in the debates
of the federal convention, the Framer's intent was to alter majori-
ty rule only in certain, limited instances. The passage of ordinary
legislation by a supermajority vote is in conflict with the
Framer's intent to permit the majority to speak for the will of the
people and not be subject to an obstinate minority.'5 7
Textual Indications of Majority Rule
When the Constitution requires that a measure be enacted
only by a supermajority, a supermajority is positively
provided.'58 Further, there are other contextual clues of ma-
152. Id.
153. Id. at 492.
154. Id. at 489-90.
155. ELLIOT, cited at note 146, at 490-91.
156. Id. at 491.
157. Id. at 262.
158. Two-thirds. of the members present in the Senate are required to convict
in an impeachment proceeding. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl 6. Two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the House or Senate are required to expel a member. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5,
cl. 2. Two-thirds of the members of each house are necessary to override a Presiden-
tial veto. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. Two-thirds of the members of the Senate
concur in the making of all treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Two-thirds of
both houses are needed to propose constitutional amendments, and the legislatures
or conventions of three-fourths of the states must ratify such. U.S. CONST. art. V. If
a Presidential election is decided in the House, a quorum consists of a member or
members from two-thirds of the states. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Two-thirds of the
members of the Senate constitute a quorum for the selection of the Vice President.
U.S. CONST. amend XII. A vote of two-thirds of each house may remove the disabili-
ty imposed on persons having engaged in rebellion or insurrection. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 3. A two-thirds vote of both houses is required to determine that the
President continues to be unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
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jority rule. For example, it would appear odd for the authors of
the Constitution to require the Vice President of the United
States to break a tie in the Senate if they envisioned a time
when majority vote would not be sufficient.1"9
Also, the procedures for passing a bill indicate a textual com-
mitment to majority rule. Article I, section 7 of the Constitution
provides that after a bill has passed the House and the Senate, it
is to be presented to the President."s If the President refuses to
sign the bill or vetoes the legislation, the veto may be overridden
by two-thirds of both houses of Congress.' 6' Again, this clearly
evidences an intent by the Framers that simple legislation should
be passed by a majority of the House. In the same section of the
Constitution, the authors required two-thirds of the membership
to approve of an override and purposely omitted a two-thirds re-
quirement to perform simple legislative duties. It would have
been redundant for the authors of the Constitution to include the
two-thirds provision in the override vote if they imagined a time
when a majority would not be enough. Clearly, they did not.
It is only fair to note, however, that there is no express consti-
tutional provision which requires a majority in passing simple
legislation. All intent of the Framers must be gleaned from other
provisions of the Constitution and the debates surrounding its
enactment. However, again, it is asserted that the lack of express
language regarding the passage of legislation is not because the
Framers envisioned a more flexible voting process. Instead, the
language is absent because they worked under the assumption
that majority rule was the fairest form of government. To reiter-
ate that in every provision would have insulted the constitutional
framework they sought to create.
CONCLUSION
The rules of the House of Representatives are internal proce-
dures that should remain solely under the authority of the legis-
lative branch. The Congress must be able to conduct its day-to-
day legislative duties as it deems necessary. However, the Article
I, section 5 power to determine the "Rules of its Proceedings"1
62
does not grant Congress the power to enact legislative rules
which contravene the United States Constitution. Because Sec-
159.' See U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 3. Section 3, clause 3 provides that the,
"Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have
no Vote, unless they be equally divided." Id.
160. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
161. Id.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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tion 106 of the Contract with America explicitly conflicts with the
Constitution and the intent of the Framers, it should not be pro-
tected merely because it is a procedural rule.
This comment exhibits that House rules with constitutional
implications can be and have been challenged in federal court.
Both legislators and private citizens through their legislator can
satisfy the Article III requirements of standing to assert a claim,
and further, once standing is satisfied, the House Rule should not
be spared by the political question doctrine. In this instance, the
determination of whether the House Rule violates the Consti-
tution is pure constitutional interpretation without any interven-
tion by the court instructing the House on what rule to enact.
Regardless of the politics surrounding the House Rule, constitu-
tional interpretation is designated to one branch of the govern-
ment, and in this instance, the determination of whether Section
106 of the Contract with America is constitutional may be and
should be heard in federal court.
Christopher J. Soller
